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During the last decades many traditionally organized agricultural cooperatives in the western 
economies have undergone profound changes. Some have transformed into another cooperative 
organizational model, for example by introducing individual ownership by the members (Nilsson 
& Ohlsson, 2007). Others have disappeared due to mergers or acquisitions (Chaddad and Cook, 
2007; van der Krogt, Nilsson and Høst, 2007). A number of bankruptcies have taken place, not 
the least in North America (Lang, 2006). Some cooperatives have sold a part of their business 
activities to investors, thus getting a hybrid type of cooperative (van Bekkum and Bijman, 2006). 
Still others have converted into investor-owned firms (IOFs).  
 
Most cooperatives are still traditionally organized. This implies a high degree of collectivism. A 
large share of the equity is unallocated capital, built up from retained profits over the years. The 
control is by the principle of one member – one vote. Equal treatment of the members is essential 
(Nilsson, 2001). This study concerns traditional agricultural cooperatives in industrialized 
countries. Many other cooperative structures exist, involving individualized ownership and 
external co-owners, proportional voting, differentiated member treatment, etc. (Kyriakopoulos, 
2000; van Bekkum, 2001).  
 
The problems that many traditional cooperatives have had during the last few decades are most 
likely to be due to some new structural factors in the business environments. These changes may 
have forced the cooperatives to adapt in ways that they are not built to handle.  
 
This study attempts to explore some of these factors, focusing on member behavior variables. 
Hence, the aim of this study is to explore how the members behave in relation to a large, 
traditionally organized cooperative that is adapting to intensified competition.  
 
The article is organized as follows. The next section comprises a presentation of the theoretical 
framework, focusing on some studies, which claim that large traditional cooperatives will have 
difficulties when competition becomes very severe. This account results in a few hypotheses. 
The methodological bases, including data collection and measures, are explained in the 
subsequent section. The following section presents results and a discussion, while the last section 




Explanations to the Demise of Traditional Cooperatives 
 
The problems of traditional cooperatives have caught the interest of many researchers. Some of 
these studies are presented here. These are selected as they have fundamentally different 
theoretical bases. Table 1 provides an overview. 
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Table 1. A selection of theoretical approaches to explain why large and complex traditional co-
operatives may face problems. 








Large size of operations is necessary but 
then members will free-ride, become 
uninterested, etc.  
 
Exit, conversions to IOFs, 
or reorientation to 
individualized structures 
Fulton, 1995  Property rights 
theory  
Technological advancements change the 
locus of power in the value chain 
The cooperatives’ power is 
reduced  
Bager, 1996  Population ecology  Techno-economic and institutional 
changes induce the cooperatives to 
imitate other businesses  
Conversions, or at least the 





and agency theory 
Markets are becoming more open, more 
transparent, and larger.  







As the capital markets function better, 
the cooperatives’ investment portfolios 
become suboptimal.  
Traditional cooperative are 
increasingly inefficient 
Hogeland, 2006  The economic 
culture 
Industrialization of agriculture, 
processing becomes large scale and 
capital intensive. 
Traditional cooperatives 
face difficulties due to 
ignorant members 
 
Cook (1995) suggests a life-cycle model for cooperatives: (1) establishment, (2) survival of 
infant stage, (3) growth and consolidation, whereby problems of so-called vaguely defined 
property rights (VDPR) appear; (4) struggle against the VDPR problems; (5) either exiting, 
restructuring (including choosing a hybrid model, and involving outside co-owners), or shifting 
(choosing an individualized cooperative model, implying tradable delivery rights). These 
problems entail, for example, that members of collective organizations do not want to invest; 
they do not reap benefits from all the investments in the cooperative; they try to be free-riders; 
they are not able to control the management. In order to give benefits to the members the 
cooperatives grow both horizontally and vertically. Increasing size and complexity means that 
problems in connection with VDPR become increasingly serious. 
 
Fulton (1995) chooses a property rights theoretical approach, noting that the locus of power in 
any value chain is with the party that has the most importance for the other parties in this chain. 
Historically, agricultural cooperatives have been the most crucial link in the chain to the extent 
that their members have been able to produce large volumes of products at a high and even 
quality. Today, agricultural production has become less problematic as a consequence of new 
technologies and new management techniques – the concept of industrialization of agriculture 
has become widespread. As production is no longer so problematic, the marketing of the 
processed products has become the most essential task, and likewise the genetic material has 
become more important. Hence, retail chains as well as genetics firms have become stronger than 
the agricultural cooperatives.  
 
Bager (1996) uses population ecology to explain why cooperatives gradually lose their 
cooperative identity. The same view is held by Hind who finds that “co-operatives become more 
corporate oriented as they develop through time” (1997:1081) and that “in the later stages of the 
life cycle, the aspirations of the managers, rather than those of the farmers, are realised” 
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According to Bager (1996), cooperatives constitute one group in the population of formal 
organizations within an economy and an industry. In the infancy of cooperatives, the number of 
cooperatives was so large that they formed a tightly connected group, and hence there was 
“mimetic isomorphism”, such that the cooperatives tended to become similar to one another and 
dissimilar to other business firms. Today, techno-economic and institutional changes have 
resulted in large-scale cooperatives, operating internationally. Thereby the cooperatives are 
subject to “noncongruent isomorphic pressures”, driving them to adapt to the practices of IOFs. 
The farmers have social networks not only with other farmers but also with nonfarmers. The 
employees have IOFs as their optional employers, and so have the managers and even the chief 
executive officers (CEOs). Most suppliers to the cooperatives are IOFs, and so are their 
customers. The financial institutions treat cooperatives as they treat IOFs.  
 
The markets, both for agricultural products and for farm inputs, have become larger, more 
transparent and more liberalized. Therefore, according to Harte (1997), the farmers no longer 
need cooperatives for the sake of obtaining lower transaction costs. Market failures occur less 
frequently in today’s agriculture. Likewise, the internal organization costs are high in partially 
integrated vertical systems such as cooperatives, especially when these firms become large. Fully 
integrated vertical systems can be governed with lower agency costs. Hence, the conversion of 
some Irish cooperatives into IOFs has benefited the farmers.  
 
Holmström (1999) compares corporate governance of traditional cooperatives with that of IOFs. 
While the capital markets have been liberalized and are characterized by innovativeness, 
cooperatives are locked out from these. Neither members nor financial analysts scrutinize 
investments of cooperatives as their stock is not tradable. Hence cooperatives’ investment 
portfolios are suboptimal. Moreover, the collective decision-making in cooperatives contributes 
to less efficient portfolios. Especially in turbulent times, conflicts between member categories 
will hamper good investments.  
 
Hogeland (2006) explains the development in terms of economic cultures within the farmer 
communities, including in the cooperatives. The culture that is supportive for the traditionally 
organized cooperatives becomes successively threatened as the cooperatives expand. “Farmers 
wanted to use cooperatives to protect their economic independence, but cooperatives needed 
farmers to be economically dependent on them” (ibid. 67-68). Competition forces the 
cooperatives to expand. The larger the investments in the cooperatives, the more the cooperatives 
will have to control their members. Moreover, large size means heterogeneous memberships and 
thereby “multiple, sometimes conflicting, social or economic objectives” (ibid. 68). With 
growing management control, the cooperatives come to resemble their investor-owned 
competitors to the extent that the farmers become alienated in relation to the cooperatives. Trust 
and identity vanish from the memberships.  
 
The above-mentioned studies have different paradigmatic bases so it is not possible to integrate 
them, nor choose between them. Still, there seem to be some common denominators:  
 
•  Large and complex cooperatives. All markets are subject to major changes – the 
consumer goods market, the raw product market, the capital market, etc. (Fulton, 1995; 
Harte, 1997; Holmström, 1999). The traditional cooperative attributes are hindrances for Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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many types of market adaptation. The preferred strategic route is expansion (Cook, 1995; 
Bager, 1996; Hogeland, 2006). In order to reduce their costs, cooperatives are expanding 
horizontally, often through mergers. By vertical expansion, they hope to obtain profits in 
downstream or upstream business activities.  
 
•  Member dissatisfaction. The large and complex business activities as well as the large 
and heterogeneous memberships imply that members become less able to control the 
cooperatives (Cook, 1995; Bager, 1996; Harte, 1997). First, their possibility to influence 
the decision-making shrinks due to the large memberships. Second, their understanding 
of the large cooperative’s business activities becomes poor, which reduces their 
influential capacity. (Harte, 1997; Holmström, 1999). As cooperative members normally 
assess their influence to be important, dissatisfaction is likely to evolve (Hogeland, 
2006).  
 
•  Low involvement. Trust, solidarity, social cohesion, identity, and other traditional 
cooperative values are vanishing in the minds of the members (Bager, 1996). There is a 
cultural clash between members and management (Hogeland, 2006). Therefore, the 
members do not want to invest in the cooperative; they try to be free-riders; they do not 
control the management adequately, and so on (Cook, 1995; Holmström, 1999). They 
become uninvolved in the cooperative (Harte, 1997).  
 
•  Mistrust in the leadership. As the cooperative business firm has to work on market 
conditions, the management takes control (Bager, 1996). With passive and poorly 
informed members, management works autonomously from the members (Hogeland, 
2006). The board of directors, being highly dependent on the CEO, loses in legitimacy in 
the eyes of the members.  
 
Four variables are highlighted in the summary above: (1) the size and complexity of the 
cooperative, (2) members’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction, (3) members’ degree of involvement, 
and (4) members’ trust or mistrust towards the board and the CEO. Hence, the aim of this study 
can be stated in a more precise manner – it is to empirically test the effects that large size and 
great complexity of a traditionally organized cooperative have on member behavior, especially 




The above-mentioned variables are hypothesized to be related to one another as shown in Figure 
1, where (a) – (e) express the following hypotheses H1 – H5, respectively. The point of departure 
is an exogenous variable – the business environments force the cooperatives to apply strategies 
that require large investments in upstream and downstream business activities, and therefore 
large size and complex structures. What influences the members’ behavior is, however, not the 
organizational structure per se, but how members perceive this structure. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized causalities between the latent variables. 
 
The members may consider the cooperative to be so large and complex that they have difficulties 
keeping informed of the business and assessing what is happening in the firm. Hence, they 
cannot take part in the governance of the cooperative. Because members tend to consider their 
influence in cooperatives to be important (Österberg and Nilsson, 2009) they are likely to 
become dissatisfied with the cooperative. Arrow (a) in Figure 1 expresses hypothesis 1 (the 
minus signifies that a negative influence is plausible). 
 
  H1.  The more the members perceive their cooperative to be very large and very complex,    
                 the less satisfied they are.  
 
The perception of large and complex cooperatives is hypothesized to foster low involvement 
among the members. Because they have difficulties in understanding the business operations 
their interest to keep informed will fall. Low involvement also implies that members do not 
consider it important to be loyal buyers or suppliers (b in Figure 1; minus to signify a likely 
negative influence). 
 
  H2.  The more the members perceive their cooperative to be very large and very complex,  
                 the less involved they are.  
 
Dissatisfied and uninvolved members may have little trust in the leadership of the cooperative, 
be it the board of directors or the management. In the eyes of the members, the board and the 
CEO are responsible for the cooperative having developed such that they have become 
Increasing competition forces the cooperatives to apply market strategies that demand large and 
complex operations 
Members’ satisfaction with the cooperative 
as a trading partner and as a member 
organization 
Members’ involvement in the cooperative’s 
democracy, in its business activities, and in 
information collection 
c. +  d. + 
a. -  b. - 
e. + 
Members’ trust in the board of directors and in the management 
Members’ belief that organizational remodeling may create better member control 
Members’ perception of the cooperative to be too large and too complex to be controlled by the 
membership 
 Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 
 2009 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
107 
dissatisfied and uninvolved (c and d in Figure 1; plusses mean that positive influences are 
expected). 
 
  H3.   The less satisfied the members are with the cooperative, the less trust they have in the            
                   leadership.  
 
  H4.  The less involved the members are in the cooperative, the less trust they have in the  
                  leadership.  
 
These hypotheses are supplemented with a fifth one. Considering that many cooperatives have 
been converted from a traditional form into another organizational type, it makes sense to 
investigate the chances that the large and complex traditional cooperatives have for survival in 
another organizational form. However, considering the gloomy nature of the four preceding 
hypotheses, also the fifth one states that remodeling attempts will be difficult to conduct (e in 
Figure 1; a plus says that a positive influence is expected):  
 
  H5. The less trust the members have in the leadership of a cooperative, the less they believe  
               in remodeling measures. 
 
Three of the hypothesized relationships (H3, H4, and H5) have been subject to empirical 
investigation in earlier studies. The two other relationships (H1 and H2) do not seem to have 
been investigated previously.  
 
Hypotheses H3 and H4: Gray and Kraenzle (1998) found that members’ participation 
(attendance at meetings, serving on committees or as elected officers, and recruiting other 
farmers to become members) is positively correlated to a number of variables, including 
“satisfaction with my district director”. Although the concepts are not identical, this finding may 
indicate that involvement and satisfaction are linked to the members’ view of the leadership.  
 
Hypothesis H4: A study by James and Sykuta (2006) showed that the farmers’ trust in their 
cooperative is positively correlated with their propensity to patronize this cooperative. It is likely 
that their preference of the cooperative is a consequence of satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis H5: Borgen (2001) found a strong link between the members’ trust in the 
management and their identification with the cooperative. Hansen, Morrow and Batista (2002) 
demonstrated that the members’ trust in the management (as well as their trust in each other) is 
related to the cohesion within the membership – a concept that may have connections to 
involvement.  
 
Few studies have investigated the relationships between the behavioral concepts, which are in 
focus in this study. Still, the findings reported in these studies seem to support the hypotheses. 
The following section explains how the five variables are interpreted so they can be transformed 
into questions and statements in a questionnaire.  
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The Members’ Perception of Whether the Cooperative is too Large and too Complex to be 
Controlled by the Membership. 
 
Organizational size and complexity can be assessed objectively, i.e., in terms of volumes, 
numbers, and currency units. However, what constitutes the driving force is the members’ 
perception of the cooperatives’ size and complexity. Hence, the focus is on the members’ 
opinions.  
 
A cooperative is both a business firm, which the members buy supplies from and sell their 
products to, and a member organization, where they exert their influence, to which they have 
applied for membership and where they have invested money. Both the business firm and the 
member organization are important and should be kept apart. Although the members probably 
have the same opinion about the business firm and the member organization, one can imagine 
situations where the two are assessed differently. For example, a local cooperative may have a 
small member organization, but this cooperative’s businesses could be conducted by a federated 
cooperative that is large and complex.  
 
Therefore, the questionnaire comprises the two following statements, one for each of the member 
organization and the business firm. Both statements should be answered by the respondents on a 
five-level Likert scale, running from (1) “do not agree” via (3) “agree to some extent” to (5) 
“agree completely”. The two statements express only one dimension of the members’ attitude 
towards the cooperative’s size and complexity, namely their ability to keep informed about the 
firm’s operations, but this dimension is probably one of the most crucial ones.  
 
•  Organizational size: The cooperative’s expansion and internationalization makes it 
difficult for me to inform myself and to understand the business results.  
•  Organizational complexity: Because the cooperative has become larger and more 
complex, it is difficult for me to be informed about its business activities, and therefore, I 
do not attend the annual meetings.  
 
Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Cooperative as a Trading Partner and as a Member 
Organization 
 
Satisfaction expresses whether a person feels that a need or a desire is fulfilled, in this case the 
members’ demands on the cooperative. Hansen et al. (2002: 45) link member satisfaction to the 
performance of the cooperatives, saying that satisfaction results when the farmer’s expectations 
as to cooperative performance are met: “assessments … involve both financial indicators of 
performance … and nonfinancial indicators of performance.” 
 
The members’ degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the cooperative could refer to the 
member organization as well as the business organization. Hence two statements are presented, 
both to be answered on a five-level Likert scale from (1) “very dissatisfied”, via (3) “neither nor” 
to (5) “very satisfied”.  
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•  Satisfaction with organization: How satisfied are you with the cooperative’s member 
organization (regarding member activities, information giving, treatment, etc.)?  
•  Satisfaction with business: How satisfied are you with the cooperative as a trading  
      partner regarding price levels, offers, treatment, etc.?  
 
Involvement in the Cooperative’s Member Democracy, in its Business Activities, and in 
Information Collection 
 
Involvement is a concept expressing individuals’ psychological attachment to a phenomenon. It 
is related to “identification” (Borgen, 2001) and to “ethics”. Given this, Zusman claims it to be 
of immense importance (1993: 53): “if members’ ethical attitudes are too weak to support the 
cooperative enterprise, it is bound to fail sooner or later”. Cooperative members may be involved 
in the business activities of the cooperative, i.e., be loyal in buying from or selling to the 
cooperative, as well as involved in the cooperative member organization, for example, taking 
part in the member democracy. Both aspects are included here. Involvement can be based on 
cooperative ideology, comprising a set of social values, or on calculative behavior, i.e., the 
members’ view of prices, offers and other factual factors. There is probably an overlap between 
these two dimensions. Regardless, it is difficult to separate them from one another. Hence, this 
study does not distinguish between ideological and economic motivational forces.  
 
Four involvement variables are specified, each expressing one type of behavior. Meeting 
attendance is answered by (1) “yes” or (0) “no”; Loyalty has a five-level Likert scale ranging 
from (1) “no” to (5) “yes”; Information gathering has a five-level Likert scale from (1) “very 
little” to (5) “very much”; Voting has a five-level Likert scale from (1) “do not agree”, via (3) 
“neither nor” to (5) “agree completely”. 
 
•  Meeting attendance: Did you attend the cooperative’s annual meeting last time? 
•  Loyalty: Do you consider yourself to be a loyal member in the sense that you always or  
  almost always do you business with the cooperative, etc.?  
•  Information gathering: How much do you involve yourself in gathering information  
  about the cooperative’s operations and its development? 
•  Voting: My vote makes a difference. 
 
Trust or Mistrust in the Board of Directors and in the Management 
 
A widely accepted definition is that “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intentions to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998: 395). To the extent that the members are dependent 
upon the cooperative for the sake of their incomes, they are vulnerable, and hence they may have 
more or less trust in the persons who run the cooperative.  
 
The leadership of a cooperative consists of two parties, namely the board of directors and the 
CEO with his or her management. It is true that the management is selected by the CEO, but the 
CEO is appointed by the board of directors. Therefore, formally the board is responsible for the 
CEO’s actions. On the other hand, a large share of the daily business activities that the members 
meet is the responsibility of the CEO. Hence, both the board of directors and the CEO are 
included.  Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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Two statements are presented to the recipients of the questionnaire. Both are answered with the 
help of a five-level Likert scale, running from (1) “do not agree” via (3) “agree to some extent” 
to (5) “agree completely”. 
 
•  Trust in management: The top management works in the best interest of the members.  
•  Trust in board: I have trust in the elected representatives.  
 
Belief that an Organizational Remodeling may Cause Better Member Control 
 
The board of the cooperative under study is trying to find solutions to the problems that the 
cooperative has. When the survey was conducted, the member organization had just been subject 
to major changes intended to bridge the gap between members and the elected representatives. 
Two questions are given to measure the members’ reaction to this organizational remodeling, 
both to be answered with (1) “yes” or (0) “no”.  
 
•  Remodeling for democracy: Do you think it was necessary to remodel the member 
organization to simplify the member democracy?  
•  Remodeling for information: Has the remodeling of the member organization made it 




Lantmännen (Swedish Farmers’ Supply and Crop Marketing Association) 
 
The data were collected through a mail survey among members of Lantmännen (Swedish 
Farmers’ Supply and Crop Marketing Association). At the time of the data collection this was a 
traditionally structured cooperative in the grain marketing and farm supply industry. The fact that 
the cooperative operates throughout Sweden contributes to membership heterogeneity. The 
number of members was 44,000, including 3900 members of 24 local cooperatives, which were 
affiliated to Lantmännen. The cooperative had nearly 13,000 employees. These figures like all 
the other data are the latest ones obtainable in early 2006, when the data collection was 
conducted.  
 
Lantmännen is characterized by vertical integration to a remarkable extent. Its operations are 
divided into ten business branches, of which only one is doing business with the farmer 
members. This branch buys grain, oil seed and other crops from farmers and sells fodder, 
fertilizers, pesticides, etc. to the farmers. The businesses with the farmers are conducted through 
a network of offices and retail outlets as well as via phone and Internet. Lantmännen is clearly 
the market dominating firm in virtually all products sold to farmers and bought from farmers. 
The farmer-oriented business operations account, however, for less than one-quarter of the 
turnover. 
 
The other nine branches are a retail chain, grain milling, cereal manufacturing, bakeries, broiler 
slaughtering, plant breeding, agricultural machines and other heavy duty machines, energy 
production, and an investment branch. The last branch includes, among other things, potato 
processing, alcohol production, chicken hatching, and pet food. Many of the consumer products 
are market leaders with very strong brand names.  Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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The total turnover amounts to SEK 33 billions (approximately € 3.5 billions or US$ 5.2 billions). 
About 65% of this amount is business in Sweden; 15% in the neighboring Scandinavian 
countries; 15% in the rest of Europe, and the remaining share outside Europe. Lantmännen has 
operations in 19 countries. The expansion has during the last years been strong in Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Lantmännen was established in its present form in 2001, after a merger between nine regional 
cooperatives and the federative organization that was controlled by all the regional cooperatives. 
The former federative was established in 1895 and a few of the constituent cooperatives were 
founded in 1880. The reason for the merger was that it would thereby be possible to increase the 
efficiency through economies of scale as well as economies of scope.  
 
To convince the members of the regional cooperatives to vote in favor of the merger, they were 
promised that each region would retain a considerable degree of self-rule after the merger. This 
strategy was successful so the members accepted the merger proposal. However, letting the 
regions decide about issues such as grain prices, logistics, elevators, and retail outlets implied 
that the new cooperative got much higher costs than was necessary. Thus, from 2005 the regions 
were dissolved, so the partial self-rule regime was abandoned, and all business decisions were 
made at the headquarters in Stockholm.  
 
The centralized decision-making meant that 67 of the 92 elevators could be closed, and this 
process will continue until there are only 15 elevators remaining. The retail stores, which used to 
be run by the regional cooperatives, were joined into a nationwide chain. The combined 
assortment of the retail outlets will be cut from 100,000 items to 15,000 items. Many retail stores 
have been closed and a few others are being established.  
 
Prior to these reorganization measures Lantmännen’s price levels were poorer than the prices of 
the IOF competitors. This was so both when Lantmännen bought grain from the members and 
when it sold fertilizers, diesel, seed and other farm inputs to the members. After the cost-saving 
measures have been implemented, the price levels have been improved. For example, the grain is 
paid at a ten percent higher price thanks to the cost savings.  
 
From 2006 a new membership organization was introduced. The previously 85 wards were 
reduced to 32 wards. One echelon in the member democratic hierarchy was removed. The 
number of elected representatives was reduced drastically. The rationale was to bring members 
closer to the board of directors. Thereby, Lantmännen hoped for a higher attendance of the 
yearly meetings. In 2007, 3.6% of the members took part in the meetings, but the participating 
farmers account for 11% of the supplies sold to members and 13% of the grain deliveries, so the 
meetings attracted mainly large and active farmers.  
 
Lantmännen’s equity capital is SEK 9 billion (approximately € 950 million or US$ 1.4 billion), 
with an equity share of 37%. Most of the equity (83%) is unallocated, built up over the decades 
from retained earnings. The shares are redeemed to exiting member at par value. The members 
get a high interest rate for their investments in the cooperative, and bonus shares are regularly 
distributed to members. As in all Swedish cooperatives the principle of one member, one vote is 
applied. The principle of equal treatment of members is included in the Swedish legislation.  Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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Lantmännen conducts regularly measurements of member satisfaction with the cooperative. The 
satisfaction indices indicate that the members have criticism of the cooperative. The board of 
directors is worried about the low member support (probably due to the many closures of 
elevators and retail shops), the low attendance of meetings and the low return on equity – less 




Data were collected through a mail survey among members of Lantmännen in early 2007. The 
fact that members of just one cooperative in one country constitute the data source does, of 
course, reduce the possibility of generalizing the findings to other settings.  
 
Two regions within Lantmännen were selected – one in the southernmost province of Sweden 
and the other in mid-Sweden. These two are intensive agricultural areas with many farmers and 
with a large production volume; hence they are not representative of the entire membership. A 
random sample of 300 members in each of the two regions received a questionnaire. After one 
reminder a response rate of 36% was achieved, i.e., 205 recipients filled-in questionnaires. No 
call-backs to the missing respondents were carried out. Due to the requirement that all the twelve 
inquiry variables should be answered, the number of usable questionnaires was reduced to 115. 
This number seems to be low. However, as indicated in the next section the number is large 
enough to validate correlations of practical importance. For large populations, where the sample 
values among different farmers can be considered as independent, only the sample size matters, 
not the proportion selected. 
 
The response rate was probably negatively affected by the fact that the questionnaires were sent 
in the month of April. At this time of the year Swedish farmers are busy in the fields.  
 
The age span 51-60 years is somewhat overrepresented in the sample in comparison with the 
total population. In the other age spans as well as genders and production orientation, the 
respondents correspond roughly to the population at large. Of the respondents, 25% are above 60 
years of age; 40% are 51-60; 20% are in the age span 41-50; the rest are below 40. Nearly 90% 
of the respondents are men, and almost half of them have crop production as their main 
production line.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Assumptions for Statistical Analysis 
 
In the statistical methods used it is assumed that the data can be considered as a sample from a 
multivariate normal probability distribution. Because the answers are integer-valued, the normal 
distribution can only be an approximation. However, in most cases, bar charts of the inquiry 
answers on the Likert scale show unimodal patterns and the dichotomous answers are not 
extremely unbalanced. Moreover, scatter diagrams of two inquiry variables show elliptical 
patterns similar to the bivariate normal distribution. Hence, the approximation to the normal 
distribution is satisfactory for the purposes of this study. Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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The number of questionnaires (115) with complete answers for the twelve variables corresponds 
to a low response rate (19%). However, for an estimated correlation coefficient r of two 
variables, the usual way to express the  uncertainty is by the standard error of the estimate given 
as se(r)= 115 / ) 1 (
2 r −  which for |r|≥0.2 satisfies  . 09 . 0 ) ( ≤ r se  A confidence interval at the 
approximate level 95% for the true correlation is calculated by  ) ( 96 . 1 r se r ± . If r=0.2 the interval 
is  ) 38 . 0 , 02 . 0 ( ) 09 . 0 96 . 1 2 . 0 ( = × ±  not including 0. As a 95% confidence interval corresponds to 
a test at level 5%, the hypothesis of true zero correlation is rejected if |r|≥0.2 as the confidence 
interval will not contain 0. Hence, it can be expected that a number of 115 questionnaires is large 
enough to detect correlations of sizes ≤–0.2 and ≥0.2. 
 
Explorative Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis was used as an approach to find latent variables for the inquiry variables. A 
model including five factors was estimated by maximum likelihood succeeded by rotation 
according to the varimax criterion (Johnson and Wichern, 2007). The procedure Factor of the 
statistical package SAS (2004) was used for the numerical calculations. The resulting loadings 
and specific variances based on the original correlation matrix of the inquiry variables are given 
in Table 2. The original correlations are presented in Table 6 (See Appendix). 
 
Table 2. Estimated loadings (after varimax rotation) and specific variances  i Ψ ˆ 1
Variable 
  
Factor   
  1  











Belief in org. 
remodeling 
  i Ψ ˆ  
Organizational size  0.29  -0.07  -0.02  -0.12  -0.10  0.88 
Organizational complexity  0.90  -0.21  -0.34  -0.02  -0.16  0 
Satisfaction with organization  -0.24  0.47  0.21  0.27  0.30  0.51 
Satisfaction with business  -0.15  0.96  0.10  0.17  0.13  0 
Meeting attendance  -0.15  0.08  0.59  0.05  0.13  0.60 
Loyalty  -0.13  0.41  0.46  0.22  0.14  0.54 
Information gathering  -0.10  0.11  0.97  0.13  0.15  0 
Voting  -0.09  0.12  0.04  0.24  0.35  0.79 
Trust in management  -0.28  0.44  0.20  0.39  0.23  0.48 
Trust in board  -0.16  0.29  0.18  0.90  0.20  0 
Remodeling for democracy  -0.18  0.11  0.20  0.06  0.50  0.66 
Remodeling for information  -0.12  0.12  0.15  0.11  0.97  0 
 
The communalities, i.e. the part of the variation explained by the factors, can be obtained as the 
sum of squares of the loadings or equivalently as 1- i Ψ ˆ . 
 
Strong loadings (>0.9 or <–0.9) and other loadings included in the initial structural model 
studied in the next section are marked in boldface. The factors have been included in decreasing 
order of absolute loading until they contribute to 90% or more to the communality of the inquiry 
variable. A tentative interpretation of the factors is: 1) Organizational size and complexity 2) 
                                                        
1 The loadings in boldface are re-estimated and the others are set to zero in the initial structural equation model, cf. 
Table 3. 
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Member satisfaction, 3) Involvement, 4) Trust in leadership, and 5) Belief in organizational 
remodeling (cf. Section “Theoretical framework” and Figure 1). 
 
Confirmative Factor Analysis  
 
In the model studied in this section, the latent factors are initially modeled with the tentative 
factor 1) as an exogenous variable and the other factors as endogenous related as in Figure 1. The 
initial model includes the relationships to the manifest variables as indicated by boldfaced 
numbers in Table 2. The numerical evaluations for the models in this subsection were performed 
by the procedure Calis of SAS (2004). The resulting estimates of loadings and coefficients are 
exhibited in Table 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3. Estimated loadings and specific variances of initial structural equation model. 
Variable  Latent Variable   
  1  











Belief in org. 
remodeling 
i Ψ ˆ  
Organizational size  0.25         -0.09     -0.03  0.90 
Organizational complexity  1.05    0.11      0 
Satisfaction with organization  -0.17  0.29       0.26      0.19  0.51 
Satisfaction with business    1.00        0.01 
Meeting attendance  -0.11    0.56      0.60 
Loyalty    0.29  0.41     0.17    0.53 
Information gathering      1.00      0 
Voting    -0.07       0.28     0.30  0.79 
Trust in management  -0.19  0.16       0.48     0.07  0.46 
Trust in board    -0.24       1.07    0.14 
Remodeling for democracy  -0.14    0.07        0.50  0.66 
Remodeling for information              1.00  0 
 
Table 4. Estimated path coefficients for latent variables in initial model.  
Endogenous Variable    Latent Variable 
  1  










2 Member satisfaction  -0.40       
3 Involvement  -0.55       
4 Trust in leadership    0.63  0.24   
5 Belief in org. remodeling        0.42 
 
The largest difference between the observed correlations and those predicted by the model is  
0.19 (the variables Organizational complexity and Remodeling for information). Summary 
indicators for the fit of the model are Akaike’s Information Criterion, AIC=–38.5 and Bentler 
and Bonnet’s Normed Fit Index, NFI=0.9536. 
 
Lagrange multipliers and Wald tests can be used to suggest modifications of the model. These 
indicators were repeatedly used to balance the requirements of simplification and better fit of the 
model. The AIC value includes this whereas NFI should show only a small decrease when the 
model is simplified. The modifications result in a final model as presented in Table 5 and Figure 
2. Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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Latent Variable   
1 











Belief in org. 
remodeling 
  i Ψ ˆ  
Organizational size  0.31              0.90 
Organizational complexity  1.13        0.29  0 
Satisfaction with 
organization 
-0.19  0.36    0.21  0.15  0.52 
Satisfaction with business    1        0 
Meeting attendance      0.62      0.61 
Loyalty    0.40  0.45      0.55 
Information gathering      1      0 
Voting        0.23  0.31  0.80 
Trust in management  -0.24  0.30    0.38    0.48 
Trust in board        1    0 
Remodeling for democracy  -0.18        0.45  0.67 





















Figure 2.  Estimated causalities (with standard errors) between the latent variables. 
 
 
Several of the path coefficients between latent and manifest variables are removed in the final 
model, whereas a path is added between the latent variables Organization size and Belief in 
organizational remodeling. The goodness-of-fit criteria for the final model are AIC=–58.1 and 
NFI=0.9567 reflecting about the same fit as the initial one because the NFI value is barely 
                                                        
2 Figures in boldface are fixed prior to estimation. 
 
Members’ perception of the cooperative to be too large and too complex to be controlled by the 
membership 
 
f. -0.50 (0.14) 
e. +0.19 (0.09) 
a. -0.43 (0.09) 
c. +0.44 (0.08) 
b. -0.50 (0.09) 
d. +0.25 (0.08) 
Members’ perception of the cooperative to be too large and too complex to be controlled by the 
membership 
 
Members’ satisfaction with the 
cooperative as a trading partner 
and as a member organization 
 
Members’ involvement in the 
cooperative’s democracy, in its business 
activities, and in information collection 
 
Members’ trust in the board of directors and in the management 
 
Members’ belief that organizational remodeling may create better member control 
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changed. However, the improvement compared to the initial model according to the lower AIC 
value is substantial, due to the removal of non-significant path coefficients. 
 
The standard errors of the estimated loadings in Table 5 vary from 0.06 to 0.14. All except two 
loadings are significant at level 5% when testing the coefficient to be zero. The exceptions are 
the one equal to 0.15 (t-statistic=1.72) between Satisfaction with organization and latent variable 
5 and the one equal to  18 . 0 −  (t=–1.92) between Remodeling for democracy and latent variable 
1. Removals of these non-significant loadings lead to higher values of the AIC criterion.  
 
The predicted correlation coefficients using the final model in Table 5 and Figure 2 are 




As in Figure 1, (a) – (e) in Figure 2 represent the hypotheses. A new relationship, (f), is included 
as the statistical test showed that this has a significant explanatory power.  
 
All standard errors in Figure 2 are smaller than half the absolute values of the corresponding path 
coefficients. Hence, the relationships among the latent variables all show significant results when 
tested to be zero. The relationships can be explained as follows:  
 
•  The more (less) the members think that the cooperative is too large and too complex to be 
controlled by the membership, (a) the less (more) satisfied they are with the cooperative 
as a trading partner and as a member organization (H1), (b) the less (more) involved they 
are in the cooperative’s member democracy, in its business activities and in information 
collection (H2), and (f) the less (more) they believe that organizational changes in the 
cooperative can improve member control.  
 
The first two causalities are in accordance with the hypotheses whereas the third one was 
not foreseen. Rather, it was expected that the causality would be only indirect, via 
satisfaction, involvement and trust. Nevertheless the perception of too large and too 
complex an organization turned out to have influence in its own right. A plausible 
interpretation is that the members have internalized the links between perception of size 
and complexity on the one hand and satisfaction and involvement on the other hand, so 
they have given up rescue possibilities beforehand.  
 
•  The more (less) satisfied the members are with the cooperative as a trading partner and as 
a member organization, (c) the more (less) trust they have in the board of directors and in 
the management (H3).  
 
•  The more (less) involved the members are in the cooperative’s member democracy, in its 
business activities, and in information collection, (d) the more (less) trust they have in the 
board and in the management (H4).  
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•  The more (less) trust the members have in the board and in the management, (e) the more 
(less) positive they are to organizational changes which are intended to raise member 
control (H5).  
 
The theoretical model is confirmed by the empirical test. When members of a traditionally 
organized cooperative consider the cooperative to be too large and too complex to be controlled 
by the membership, they rank low in terms of satisfaction and involvement. The poor satisfaction 
and the low involvement are linked to poor trust in the board and in the management.  
 
However, there might be a possibility that the members, in spite of their dissatisfaction, low 
involvement and lack of confidence in the leadership, are willing to remodel the cooperatives to 
attain more member control. This study finds, however, that the members do not have much 
belief in this possibility.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
The findings of this study indicate that traditional cooperatives, when they become very large 
and get very complex business operations, may face difficulties in relation to their members. The 
members are no longer able to control the cooperatives, and so they become dissatisfied with the 
cooperative and they lose their involvement in it. This discontent results in the loss of trust in the 
leadership who must be held responsible for the development of the cooperative. The 
consequence may be that the members do not believe that it is possible to restore a well-
functioning member control through remodeling the cooperative.  
 
The members may understand that the cooperative must grow or merge and that it has to expand 
vertically in order to preserve its competitiveness. They may understand that these organizational 
changes are necessary for the cooperative to offer good prices and good services to the members. 
Nevertheless, the development implies that the cooperative will act as any other firm on the 
market.  
 
Another dimension of this development concerns the financial aspects. As the cooperatives 
expand, the farmers do not want to and are not able to invest sufficiently large amounts of money 
and so outside investors often become stakeholders in the cooperatives. The external co-owners 
bring with them another way of doing business, which is often not appreciated by the farmers.  
 
This process is parallel to what Hogeland (2006) describes in terms of changing cultures within 
the farmer communities. The cooperatives must integrate horizontally and vertically if they are to 
preserve their competitiveness. A consequence is that the farmers become alienated to the 
cooperatives. Holmström (1999) explains that the increasing business volume of the cooperatives 
and the growing assets create problems in terms of suboptimal investments as well as inefficient 
decision-making.  
 
The shrinking member control in the large cooperatives is, according to Harte (1997), a natural 
effect of better functioning markets. As the cooperatives can no longer contribute to lower the 
farmers’ transaction costs, the farmers will have less interest in the cooperatives. Bager (1996) 
supported by Hind (1997; 1999) claims that the management has taken control of the Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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cooperatives to the detriment of the farmers – also this can be expressed in terms of changing 
cultures. Fulton (1995) says that changes in the structure of agriculture (industrialization) have 
decreased the power of the cooperatives. As the cooperatives try to adapt to the new market 
conditions, the farmers are affected. Thus, the cooperatives are entering the fifth stage in Cook’s 
(1995) life cycle, the one where cooperatives have to conduct major structural changes as the 
problems of the vaguely defined property rights have become too serious.  
 
All the above-mentioned studies are observations written by insightful researchers. The present 
study provides rigid empirical support to these studies. It must however be born in mind that this 
study concerns one single cooperative, based in one country and operating in a specific industry. 
Hence, these findings can not be claimed to have general validity.  
 
If the board of a troubled cooperatives does not succeed in limited reform endeavors (such as 
those studied here) it may be compelled to choose more radical organizational changes, 
notwithstanding weak member support. This will probably imply another ownership structure – 
the introduction of tradable and appreciable delivery rights, the conversion of the cooperative 
society into a holding company with the membership as stockholders, and other measures. The 
common denominator for these options is that there must be a solution to the problems of the so-
called vaguely defined property rights. Hence, more individualized ownership is required, by the 
farmer members, by farmer organizations or by external financiers. If the members do not care 
much about their cooperative in their patron role, they may become more involved in an investor 
role. 
 
The board of directors of the cooperative under study has in the spring 2009, after the data for 
this study were collected, made a decision to remodel its organizational form. Maintaining the 
cooperative business form, it has increased the individual ownership and offered a market for 
two new types of shares. The experiences from the spring and the summer 2009 are, however, 
not very positive. The members have shown only little interest in the new shares and only few 
shares are traded on the market for these shares. The board has also started a process of focusing 
the business operations, selling out peripheral units. These new strategy has been successful, also 




Bager, T. (1996). Organisations in sectors. Explaining the dissemination of populations of 
formal organization in economic sectors – bridging rational choice and institutional 
approaches. Esbjerg, Denmark: South Jutland University Press.  
 
Borgen, S.O. (2001). Identification as a trust-generating mechanism in cooperatives. Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 72 (2), 208–228. 
 
Chaddad, F.R., & Cook. M.L. (2007). Conversions and other forms of exit in U.S. agricultural 
cooperatives. In Karantininis, K., & Nilsson, J. (Eds), Vertical Markets and Cooperative 
Hierarchies. The Role of Cooperative in the Agri-Food Industry. Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Springer, 61–72.  
 Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 
 2009 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
119 
Cook, M.L. (1995). The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 77, 1153–1159.  
 
Fulton, M. (1995). The future of cooperatives in Canada: A property rights approach. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, 1144–1152. 
 
Gray, T.W., & Kraenzle, C.A. (1998). Member participation in agricultural cooperatives: A 
regression and scale analysis. RBS Research Report 165. Washington DC: US 
Department of Agriculture, Rural Business – Cooperative Service.  
 
Hansen, M.H., Morrow Jr., J.L., & Batista, J.C. (2002). The impact of trust on cooperative 
membership retention, performance and satisfaction: An exploratory study. International 
Food & Agribusiness Management Review 5, 41–59.  
 
Harte, L.N. (1997). Creeping privatisation of Irish co-operatives. A transaction cost explanation. 
In Nilsson, J., & van Dijk, G. (Eds), Strategies and Structures in the Agro-food 
Industries. Assen, Netherlands: van Gorcum, 31–53. 
 
Hind, A.M. (1997). The changing values of the cooperative and its business focus. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, 1077–1082.  
 
Hind, A.M. (1999). Co-operative life cycle and goals. Journal of Agricultural Economics 50 (3), 
536–548. 
 
Hogeland, J.A. (2006). The economic culture of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Culture & 
Agriculture 28 (2), 67–79. 
 
Holmström, B. (1999). The future of cooperatives: A corporate perspective. Finnish Journal of 
Business Economics 48 (4), 404–417.  
 
James Jr., H.S., & Sykuta, M.E. (2006). Farmer trust in producer- and investor-owed firms: 
Evidence from Missouri corn and soybean producers. Agribusiness. An International 
Journal 22 (1), 135–153.  
 
Johnson R.A., & Wichern D.W. (2007). Applied multivariate statistical analysis, Sixth ed. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Kyriakopoulos, K. (2000). The market orientation of cooperative organizations. learning 
strategies and structures for integrating firm and members. Assen, Netherlands: van 
Gorcum.  
 
Lang, K.A. (2006). Cognition, agency theory and organizational failure: A Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool case study. MSc thesis, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan.  
 
Nilsson, J. (2001). Farmer co-operatives: Organizational models and their business environment. 
In Birchall, J. (Ed), The New Mutualism in Public Policy. London, U.K.: Routledge, 132–
154.  Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 




Nilsson, J., & Ohlsson, C. (2007). The New Zealand dairy cooperatives’ adaptation to changing 
market conditions. Journal of Rural Cooperation 35 (1), 43–70. 
 
Österberg, P., & Nilsson, J. (2009). Members’ Perception of their Participation in the 
Governance of Cooperatives: The Key to Trust and Commitment in Agricultural 
Cooperatives. Agribusiness. An International Journal 25 (2), 181-197. 
 
Rousseau, D.M, Sitken, S.B., Burt, R.S. & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A 
cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review 23 (1), 393–404. 
 
SAS (2004) SAS/Stat 9.1 User’s Guide. Cary, North Carolina, USA: SAS Institute Inc. 
 
Van Bekkum, O.-F. (2001). Cooperative models and farm policy reform. Exploring patterns in 
structure-strategy matches of dairy cooperatives in protected vs. liberalized markets. 
Assen, Netherlands: van Gorcum.  
 
Van Bekkum, O.F., & Bijman, J., (2006). “Innovations in cooperative ownership: Converted and 
hybrid listed cooperatives”. Paper presented in 7
th International Conference of 
Management in AgriFood Chains and Networks, Ede, Netherlands, May 31–June 1. 
 
Van der Krogt, D., Nilsson, J., & Høst, V. (2007). The impact of cooperatives’ risk aversion and 
equity capital constraints on their inter-firm consolidation and collaboration strategies – 
with an empirical study of the European dairy industry. Agribusiness. An International 
Journal 23 (4), 452–472. 
 
Zusman, P. (1993). Participants’ ethical attitudes and organizational structure and performance: 
Application to the cooperative enterprise. In Csaki, C., & Kislev, Y. (Eds). Agricultural 
Cooperatives in Transition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 23–54. Nilsson et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 





Table 6. Observed, above diagonal, and predicted correlations from the final model, below diagonal. Figures in boldface correspond to the   
five pairs with the largest differences of correlations. 










Loyalty  Info 
gathering 











Organizational size  1  0.31  -0.16  -0.14  -0.09  -0.06  -0.09  -0.06  -0.20  -0.20  -0.01  -0.16 
Organizational complexity  0.30  1  -0.44  -0.40  -0.38  -0.38  -0.47  -0.18  -0.46  -0.31  -0.33  -0.35 
Satisfaction with org.  -0.15  -0.43  1  0.59  0.24  0.43  0.36  0.23  0.47  0.52  0.26  0.44 
Satisfaction with business  -0.13  -0.40  0.59  1  0.19  0.51  0.26  0.22  0.58  0.50  0.22  0.30 
Meeting attendance  -0.10  -0.30  0.18  0.13  1  0.28  0.62  0.03  0.21  0.23  0.16  0.25 
Loyalty  -0.12  -0.37  0.36  0.49  0.33  1  0.55  0.23  0.43  0.45  0.19  0.29 
Information gathering  -0.16  -0.48  0.29  0.21  0.62  0.53  1  0.14  0.35  0.37  0.30  0.33 
Voting  -0.08  -0.16  0.25  0.21  0.11  0.16  0.18  1  0.25  0.35  0.24  0.40 
Trust in management  -0.15  -0.44  0.48  0.58  0.19  0.37  0.31  0.24  1  0.61  0.26  0.39 
Trust in board  -0.10  -0.25  0.49  0.49  0.22  0.35  0.35  0.33  0.59  1  0.25  0.37 
Remodeling for democracy  -0.13  -0.33  0.29  0.22  0.15  0.19  0.23  0.22  0.25  0.21  1  0.56 
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